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Abstract: In 2007, data breach issues became even more serious than in previous
years as breaches continued to occur on a regular basis, threatening the security of
over 150 million records. The second biggest data breach ever recorded occurred
this past year at the Department of Veterans Affairs, and triggered a flurry of federal
activity. This year also saw the initial settlements and resolutions of the ChoicePoint
and CardSystems incidents. The issue of data breach continues to evolve rapidly as
both the states and the federal government seek to pass legislation and address
current issues. This paper provides an update on major data breaches in the past year
and examines repercussions from previous incidents, including litigation and
settlements. It also reports on proposed and enacted legislation at the state and
federal levels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Keeping private information private has become increasingly
difficult. More and more personal data, such as medical information,
financial information, and Social Security numbers, are being collected
by a wide variety of institutions, from public to financial to
educational. The information collected is supposed to remain private
and to be used by the collecting institution only. Recently, however, it
has become clear that personal information possessed by these
institutions may be unwittingly disclosed to third parties. Data
breaches were first thrust into the spotlight in 2005, when ChoicePoint,
a data brokerage firm, sold the personal information of approximately
145,000 people to criminals posing as a small business.' Disclosures
of data breach incidents have continued at an increasing rate since the
ChoicePoint incident. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse estimates
that, since the ChoicePoint breach, over 166 million individual records
containing "sensitive personal information" have been compromised in
hundreds of separate data storage breaches.2
Several important developments in the area of data breaches
occurred in 2006 and 2007. First, major data breaches continued to
cause problems across the public and private sectors. Incidents
occurred at corporations, public and private educational institutions,
and at state and federal government agencies. Second, two issues
continued to serve as points of contention in the data breach
community: what kind of event should trigger a data breach
notification, and what the effects of data encryption might be and
whether it should serve as a safe harbor. Third, the federal
government created the Identity Theft Task Force and released new
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") guidelines, which
instruct federal agencies how to manage data breaches. Additionally,
for the first time, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") exercised its
authority over institutions suffering data breaches by assessing civil
1 See Milton Sutton, Note, Security Breach Notifications: State Laws, Federal Proposals, and
Recommendations, 2 ISJLP 927, 927 (2006) (background information on the ChoicePoint
incident); see also Derek Somogy, Note, Information Brokers and Privacy, 2 ISJLP 901
(2006).
2 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, Oct. 1, 2007,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm. But see Kenneth Dreifach, Data
Privacy, Web Security, and Attorney General Enforcement, 865 PLI/PAT 355, 362 (2006)
("Because of data breach security notification laws now in place in more than twenty states...
numerous other data breaches have been publicized.").
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fines and requiring compliance with FTC orders. Furthermore,
representatives introduced data breach legislation in both the House
and the Senate. Fourth, state legislatures adopted new data breach
laws, with Minnesota passing the most prominent data breach
notification statute. Finally, in the private sector, corporations
confronted the costs associated with preventing and discovering data
breaches, and private individuals initiated the first lawsuits against
corporations that suffered a data breach. This article addresses each of
these developments in depth and provides insight as to their effects, as
well as recommendations for the future.
II. DATA BREACH INCIDENTS
Although one author dubbed 2006 to be "the year of the data
breach,''3 2007 may contend for that title, as the rate of data breaches
increased through 2007. Institutions affected by such breaches ranged
from federal and state government agencies to educational institutions
to private corporations. The major causes of these breaches varied
with the type of institution suffering the breach. A report issued by the
American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP"), which studied
data breach incidents from January 1, 2005, to May 26, 2006,
indicated that government data breaches are primarily the result of
physical theft of electronic storage devices and the accidental
publication of personal information to the Internet.4 Educational
institutions, on the other hand, suffered over half their data breaches at
the hands of hackers. 5 Nearly forty-three percent of all data breaches
that were reported during this period involved educational
institutions.6 This underlines the importance to security administrators
of determining their institution's susceptibility to a specific method of
data breach.
' Beth Gautier, The Year of the Data Breach - 2006 Dramatically Changed the Identity Theft
Landscape, KROLL, Dec. 27, 2006, http://www.krollfraudsolutions.com/media-center/press-
release6.aspx.
4 NEAL G. WALTERS, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, INTO THE BREACH: SECURITY
BREACHES AND IDENTITY 3 (2006), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/dd142_securityLbreach.pdf
SId.
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A. STATE GOVERNMENT
In March 2006, the Ohio Secretary of State accidentally posted the
Social Security numbers of residents who made purchases using credit
cards or received bank loans on state websites where such records are
searchable by the public.7 One month later, in April, the state of Ohio
accidentally sent the Social Security numbers of possibly millions of
Ohio voters to approximately twenty political campaigns.8  The
information was accidentally recorded on CDs that were supposed to
contain only voter registration information for the campaigns to use for
telephone calls and canvassing. 9 In June 2006, the state of Minnesota
compromised the security of tax information of approximately 2,400
individuals and 48,000 businesses.10
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In May 2006, in what was the second largest overall breach at the
time, the Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") lost personally
identifiable information of more than 26 million United States
veterans.11 The information was stored unencrypted on a laptop that
an employee had taken home without proper authorization. 12  The
laptop was then stolen from the employee's home.' 3 Although the
records did not contain any health or financial information, the data
did include the Social Security numbers and birth dates of every living
veteran who served after 1974, as well as data on some of the veterans'
7 Todd Weiss, Ohio Secretary of State Sued Over ID Info Posted Online, COMPUTERWORLD,
Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/databasetopics/data/story/
0, 10801,109213,00.html.
8 Todd Weiss, Ohio Recalls Voter Registration CDs; Social Security Numbers Included,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?
command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=1 10983.
91Id.
10 Her6n M~rquez Estrada, State Taxpayer Data Lost in Mail, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR
TRIB., June 29, 2006, available at http://www.startribune.com/462/story/520906.html.
11 Terry Frieden, et al., Source: Theft of Vets 'Data Kept Secret for 19 Days, CNN.cOM, May
23, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/23/vets.dataindex.html.
12 id.
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spouses." In response, the only immediate steps taken by the VA was
to mail letters to veterans' 5  and to create a website providing
information about the incident.16
The situation was made even more difficult because the
government waited nineteen days to notify veterans that their personal
information had been compromised.' 7 This delay occurred because the
government was faced with the choice of notifying the veterans
immediately, which could tip off the laptop thieves as to the
information they were carrying, or delayin 8notification in the hopes
that the information could be recovered. The choice to delay
notification resulted in a backlash against the government as veterans
had to wait over two and a half weeks to take any steps to protect
themselves. 19  Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) called the delay
"unacceptable," and pointed out that the VA should have provided
veterans with free credit monitoring services to monitor their credit
reports for fraudulent activity.20 VA Secretary Jim Nicholson said he
was outraged by the VA's decision not to immediately disclose the
breach.2'
Other government agencies have been affected by data breaches as
well.22 In fact, since 2003, all nineteen United States government
'
4 1d
15 Letter from R. James Nicholson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, to Veterans (June 5,
2006), http://www.firstgov.gov/veteransinfoletter.shtml.
16 See USA.gov, Latest Information on Veterans Affairs Data Security,
http://www.usa.gov/veteransinfo.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Information on
Veterans Affairs]. The site answers frequently asked questions and provides veterans with
information on what steps they can take to protect themselves from damages.
17 Frieden, supra note 11.
18 id.
19Id.
20 Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, 'A Heckuva Bad Job for America's Veterans':
Reaction of Senator Patrick Leahy to the Delay of Notification of Veterans' Data Breach (May
23, 2006), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200605/052306b.html.
21 VA Chief 'Outraged' by Delay in Revealing Theft of Veterans'Data, FOX NEWS.COM, May
24, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196800,00.html.
22 See, e.g., Brian Koerner, Data Breach at the Federal Trade Commission, ABOUT.COM, June
22, 2006, http://idtheft.about.com/b/a/256579.htm; USDA Possible Personal Information
Breach, http://www.usa.gov/usdainfo.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
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agencies have reported at least one breach of personal information
under their control.23 In October 2006, the House Government Reform
Committee released a report giving the federal government a D-plus in
breach management after reviewing federal data breach incidents.24
The committee's findings emphasize the importance of physical data
security. Indeed, one of the biggest sources of data breaches is lost or
stolen laptops that contain personal information; over 1,100 have been
stolen, lost, or reported missing since 2001.25
C. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Beginning in October 2005, hackers broke into a central University
of California - Los Angeles ("UCLA") database that stored records for
approximately 800,000 former and current students and staff.26 The
hackers had access until November 2006, when their activities were
finally noticed.27 UCLA notified persons whose data may have been
compromised through a letter sent on December 12, 2006.28 One
former student reported that someone had stolen her identity and taken
out a $24,500 car loan in her name29 using her old UCLA address in
order to obtain the loan. 0 However, UCLA officials claimed they
have no evidence the data was misused.3 ' The outcome of this case
may be significant, as actual damages following a data breach have
23 Linda Rosencrance, Report: Data Loss Widespread at Government Agencies,
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/action/
article.do?connand=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9004168.
24 Bill Brenner, Feds Get a D Plus for Data Security, SEARCHSECURJTY.COM, Oct. 19, 2006,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sidl4_gci122532 1,00.html.
25 Rosencrance, supra note 23.
21 FBI Looks into UCLA Hacking Case, CBS2.coM, Dec. 13, 2006,
http://cbs2.com/local/UCLA.Computer.Hacker.2.525820.html.
27 Id.
28 See Letter from Norman Abrams, Acting Chancellor, UCLA, to potential identity theft
victims (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.identityalert.ucla.edu/IDalert letter.pdf.
29 FBI Looks into UCLA Hacking Case, supra note 26.
3 0 Id.
3' id.
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been difficult to prove. 32  The university has established an identity
alert webpage suggesting that affected persons place a fraud alert on
their credit files.3  The site further suggests that those affected should
take advantage of their federal right to one free credit report per year
from each credit reporting agency and should stagger their requests to
activate up-to-date monitoring without incurring costs. 34  However,
nowhere does the university offer any monetary assistance to affected
persons to help pay for monitoring their accounts.
35
Ohio University suffered a similar data breach when one of its
databases was breached for thirteen months, in a manner similar to the
UCLA incident.36  This occurred because the university
decommissioned a network server, excluding it from all patches and
security updates, but failed to actually take it offline.3 The university
set up a website for the over 300,000 affected alumni and friends
whose information may have been stolen from the server. 38  Ohio
University, like UCLA, recommends that those affected place a fraud
alert on their credit files.
39
III. NOTIFICATION TRIGGERS AND ENCRYPTION: Two POINTS OF
CONTENTION
To properly examine any data breach legislation, it is first
important to understand the two main points of contention:
determining what sort of breach triggers a legal requirement to notify
32 Jaikumar Vijayan, Court Dismisses Lawsuit in Merchant Data-Breach Case,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 23, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9001391.
33 See UCLA Identity Alert, http://www.identityalert.ucla.edu (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
34 id.
35 id.
36 Brian Koerner, Ohio University Data Breach, ABOUT.COM,
http://idtheft.about.com/od/2006/p/Ohio-datatheft.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
37 id.
38 Data Theft and Identity Protection at Ohio University, http://www.ohio.edu/datatheft (last
visited Jan. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Ohio University Website].
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consumers, and whether encryption serves as a safe harbor. This
section provides an overview of both topics.
A. NOTIFICATION TRIGGER
One of the most significant issues regarding data breaches is how
to properly notify individuals whose personal information has become
compromised. The issue involves determining what constitutes a
breach and which types of breaches should trigger notification. Before
current and proposed legislation can be examined, however, it is
important to understand the two types of triggers that most commonly
appear in these laws: the acquisition-based trigger, and the risk-based
trigger.
The acquisition trigger is best illustrated by California's data
breach notification law. This type of trigger is used by almost half of
the states with breach notification laws. 4( The California law, which is
the strictest of any state law, provides that notification is required after
any data breach if "the personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person., 41  The
law further provides that "disclosure shall be made in the most
expedient time possible and without unreasonable dela y. 4
2 This
language is used in other state notification laws as well.4  The most
important feature of this trigger is that it requires no evidence that an
unauthorized person actually acquired the data. It was under this type
of trigger that ChoicePoint, a Georgia corporation, first made its data
breach public pursuant to California law, a state in which ChoicePoint
does business.
40 State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Security Breach Notification Laws, July
18, 2006, http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm [hereinafter State PIRG
Summary]. Thirty-four states have breach notification laws. The sixteen states that use an
acquisition trigger are: California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
and Texas. Id.
41 CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (West 2006).
42 Id.
43 E.g., H.R. 6191 (R.I. 2005); S.B. 122 (Tex. 2005).
44 It is important to note the effect of the California law on businesses throughout the U.S.
Because corporations doing business in California must follow this law, it has become a de
facto standard across the country. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse estimates that of the
millions of records that have been compromised due to data breaches, the California law is
responsible for bringing the majority of these to light. Beth Givens, the director of the Privacy
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The benefit of the acquisition trigger is that consumers are made
aware of potential breaches of their information. A few scholars,
however, fear it results in too much reporting. Fred Cate, law
professor and director of the Center for Applied Cybersecurity
Research at Indiana University in Bloomington, has concerns about
using a low trigger, like the acquisition trigger. According to Cate
"[t]he threat of identity theft from data losses is being greatly
exaggerated, and that's because a lot of people have fallen into the trap
of equating data loss with identity theft."A, Cate is worried that low
triggers overstate the problem, which will make the response to serious
threats less effective; "it's like the boy who cried wolf.' 4 7  Cate's
prediction appears to be accurate. Greg MacSweeney, editor-in-chief
of Wall Street & Technology magazine, commented "some prett
major personal data thefts are buried deep in the papers.
MacSweeney noted that E*Trade Financial lost $18 million and TD
Ameritrade lost $4 million due to the same identity theft scam, yet "the
media coverage was ... virtually nonexistent.
' 49
The other common trigger is the "risk-based" trigger, which is
generally less favorable to consumers and friendlier to businesses. It
limits the notification to only those situations where a risk assessment
determines that a danger exists to those whose records were breached.
Eighteen states currently use some form of a risk-based trigger.50 The
current Ohio law uses such a trigger; it requires both a reasonable
belief that information was acquired, and that the acquisition of such
Rights Clearinghouse, stated that the California law is "an extraordinarily important law." She
further hints at the law's influence in stating that she "doubt[s] we'd have very much to report
to consumers if it weren't for this law." David Lazarus, New Bid to Protect Your Data, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 12, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/01/12iBUGSPNHB4T1.DTL.
45 Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, But Few Victims in Data Breaches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/technology/circuits/
27lost.html?ex=l 165122000&en=d710fla149b7bd35&ei=50700.
46 id.
47 Id. (citing Cate).
48 Posting of Greg MacSweeney to Wall Street & Technology: Blog,
http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/blog/archives/2006/l /when-risk manag.html (Nov. 29,
2006, 12:16 EST).
49 id.
50 State PIRG Summary, supra note 40.
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information "will cause a material risk of identity theft or other
fraud., 51 It should also be noted that the risk-based trigger may not
uniformly apply to all breaches like the California trigger that many
states have adopted. For instance, New Jersey's Identity Theft
Prevention Act does not require notification when "the business or
public entity establishes that misuse of the information is not
reasonably possible.,
5 2
B. ENCRYPTION
As of July 2006, no state required data custodians to provide
notification of a data breach if the compromised information is
encrypted.53 Thus, corporations can avoid being subject to notification
requirements by simply encrypting all electronically stored data.
Although encryption may seem expensive, Avivah Litan, Vice
President of Gartner Inc., testified in a congressional hearing that data
protection is much less costly than data breaches.5 4 Litan estimates
that encryption will cost $5 ,er account the first year and $1 per
account each additional year. She contrasts that with the $79 per
account that ChoicePoint had to spend as a result of its data breach. 6
If Litan's estimate is correct, then an ounce of preventative encryption
is truly worth a pound of notification. Litan recommends looking to
the Payment Card Industry's encryption standards as a guide for
developing future federal encryption standards.
57
51 H.B. 104, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
52 2005 N.J. Laws 226.
53 Bruce E. H. Johnson et al., Data Breach Notice Legislation: New Technologies and New
Privacy Duties?, 865 PLI/PAT 203, 216 (2006).
54 Data Protection is Much Less Costly than Data Breaches: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Veterans Affairs, (2006) (statement of Avivah Litan, Vice President, Gartner, Inc.), available
at http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule109/may06/5-25-06/AvivahLitan.html.
55 Id.
56 id.
57 Id. See also PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA
SECURITY STANDARD (2006) (requirement four addresses data encryption), available at
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.orgpdfs/pci-dssvl-1.pdf.
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The encryption safe harbor is favored by data brokerage firms. 58
They argue that encrypted information poses no threat, even if it falls
into the hands of identity thieves, and therefore there is no need to
disclose a breach of encrypted information.5 9 The federal government
also favors the encryption of all personal information records, as
indicated in a June memorandum from the OMB. 60  The memo
recommends that all agencies and departments "[e]ncrypt all data on
mobile computers/devices which carry agency data unless the data is
determined to be non-sensitive, in writing, by your Deputy
Secretary."' 1 The goal of the recommendation is to compensate for the
lack of physical security protections used when private information is
dealt with outside of the agency.62  Privacy writer Dennis Fisher
praises the move, calling it necessary, as he believes government
agencies do not treat personal information as carefully as
corporations. 63 Fisher believes that private companies are not likely to
58 Caron Carlson, Storm Brews Over Encryption 'Safe Harbor' in Data Breach Bills,
EWEEK.COM, May 31, 2005, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1822182,00.asp.
59 Id. At first glance, it may seem odd that some of the parties pushing for an encryption safe
harbor are also ones who may be lagging behind the federal government when it comes to full-
disk encryption. Those opposed to encryption safe harbors argue that this discrepancy is due
to the notion that establishing a safe harbor for encryption discourages corporations from
being forward-thinking in other data security measures. Bruce Schneier, Chief Technology
Officer at Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. states "[y]ou can encrypt the data with a trivial
algorithm and get around [the law]," meaning that a cursory method of encryption would
satisfy the law, but do little to protect the data. In contrast, proponents of encryption contend
that hesitation to encrypt is due to the fear that full disk encryption would slow network traffic
and applications. Instead, systems should perform encryption carefully to avoid slowdowns,
but in such a way that they still encrypt important information. See Carlson, supra note 58;
Paul F. Roberts, MCI Data Theft Intensifies Encryption Debate, EWEEK.COM, May 31, 2005,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1821333,00.asp.
60 Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt. of the Office of Management
and Budget, to the Heads of Dep'ts and Agencies 1 (June 23, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2006/m06-16.pdf.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Dennis Fisher, Federal Government Pushes Full-Disk Encryption, SEARCHSECURITY.COM,
Jan. 10, 2007, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/colunmnltem/
0,294698,sidl 4_gci 1238490,00.html ("A lost laptop full of IRS records doesn't translate into
lost revenue, it just means bad press.").
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move to full disk encryption until required to by the government
because of their concerns about short-term costs.
64
Some analysts, including Adam Golodner, oppose mandatory
encryption, especially in situations where data is not merely stored, but
is accessed frequently for use in consumer transactions.65 Golodner, a
former member of the White House E-Commerce Working Group, and
currently serving as a director in the Global Security and Technology
Policy division of Cisco Systems, states that encryption is something
to be determined by the market. 66  Golodner opines that "market
responses are generally the most powerful, efficient, and efficacious
way to address the issue., 67 Moreover, Golodner states that the first
vendors to adopt security standards such as encryption could secure a
competitive advantage, leading competitors to do the same.
68
Additionally, he stresses that implementation of mandatory policies
such as encryption can have unintended consequences. 69 Cisco could
be harmed by a mandatory encryption policy, as it has already taken
steps in accordance with its own innovation to secure its information.
70
Golodner suggests that adopting mandatory encryption could actually
cause a well-developed system, like Cisco's, to be less secure, and
potentially could discourage innovation.
7 1
64 Id. ("The problem is that the accumulated bad publicity and fines aren't nearly enough to
force companies to infringe on the productivity gains that mobile devices provide.").
65 See Adam Golodner, Address to the Progress and Freedom Foundation's Data and Security
Summit (May 10, 2006), in PROGRESS ON POINT, Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl 3.30securitysummittranscript.pdf.
66 Biography of Adam Golodner, Director of Global Security and Technology Policy for Cisco
Systems, http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/govtaffairs/images/AdamG-bio.pdf (last
visited Jan. 5, 2008). (Mr. Golodner was also the Associate Director for Policy at the Institute
for Security and Technology Studies at Dartmouth College); S. W. Smith, A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to the Marketplace, IEEE SEC. AND PRIVACY MAG., Nov/Dec 2003, at
74, available at http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/-sws/pubs/marketplace.pdf (search on
"Golodner").
67 Smith, supra note 66, at 78.
61 Id. at 77.
69 Id. at 77-78. See also Golodner, supra note 65.
70 Golodner, supra note 65, at 78.
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IV. FEDERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Federal developments have been significant in two areas. First, in
April 2007, the Identity Theft Task Force released its strategic plan for
combating identity theft,72 and worked with the OMB to develop a
memorandum that was sent to all federal agencies instructing them
how to safeguard data and handle data breach incidents.73  Second,
Congress is continuing its efforts to enact data breach legislation.
Before discussing these items, it is important to recognize the few
existing federal laws that address the issue of data breaches.
Currently, protection for electronic information is required in four
specific areas. Health information is protected by the Security Rule of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"),
which requires healthcare entities to protect against reasonably
anticipated threats to the security of stored information and to protect
against unauthorized uses or disclosures of such information.
74
Financial institutions are required to protect the data they possess
under the FTC's Safeguards Rule.75 Violations of the rule, as well as
unfair and deceptive trade practices, can result in FTC action. After
the exercise of such action, in 2006 the FTC reached settlements with
ChoicePoint 76 and CardSystems Solutions. 77  Consumers' personal
72 THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, COMBATING IDENTITY THEFT: A STRATEGIC
PLAN (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.identitytheft.gov/reports/StrategicPlan.pdf.
73 Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to the Heads of Dep'ts
and Agencies (May 22, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf.
74 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2006). For more information on HIPAA, see Sharona Hoffman &
Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REv. 331 (2007).
" 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 41-58 (LexisNexis 2007). For more information on the FTC's authority to
regulate under the Safeguard Rule, see Benita A. Kahn & Heather J. Enlow, The Federal
Trade Commission's Expansion of the Safeguards Rule, 54-SEP .FED. LAW. 39 (2007).
76 ChoicePoint had been charged under the Fair Credit Reporting Act with making consumer
credit history available to unauthorized persons and with failing to maintain procedures to
verify the identity of such persons. ChoicePoint agreed to pay $10 million in civil damages to
the FTC, the largest judgment in FTC history, with an additional $5 million in consumer
redress. Under the terms of the settlement, ChoicePoint must establish and maintain a
comprehensive data security program. ChoicePoint also must be audited biennially for the
next twenty years by a qualified, independent, third-party professional. Press Release, FTC,
ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; To Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5
Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.htm. To view a copy of the court judgment, see
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financial information is protected by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.78
Finally, information gathered online about children under the age of
thirteen is protected by the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
("COPPA"). 79
A. THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE AND
THE OMB GUIDELINES
In the wake of the VA data breach, President George W. Bush
issued an Executive Order to create an Identity Theft Task Force to
determine guidelines on how to "improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the Federal Government's activities in the areas of
identity theft awareness, prevention, detection, and prosecution. ' 80 The
task force includes the chairman of the FTC, the United States
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, among
others.8  In an interim report, the task force noted that it is "almost
inevitable" that federal agencies will experience data breaches. 82 With
United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 06-0198, (N.D. Ga. 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf. Most important, perhaps, was
that ChoicePoint was charged with violating the unfairness prong of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which makes it unlawful to engage in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
77 Although CardSystems was not subject to civil penalties as ChoicePoint was, it was
similarly required to undergo audits every two years for the next twenty years. As with
ChoicePoint, CardSystems is also required to establish and maintain a comprehensive
information security program. Press Release, FTC, CardSystems Solutions Settles FTC
Charges (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/02/cardsystemsr.shtm.
For more information on CardSystems, see Tom Krazit, Security Breach May Have Exposed
40M Credit Cards, IDG NEWS SERV., June 17, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/
databasetopics/data/story/0, 10801,102631,00.html.
78 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). For more
information on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, see Christopher Wolf, 2005 Overview of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 828 PLIIPAT 761 (2005).
79 For more information on COPPA, see Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate
Power: Towards a Re-imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 127,
151 (2006).
80 Exec. Order No. 13,402, 71 C.F.R. § 27945 (2006).
81 Id. § 2(b).
82 Jaikumar Vijayan, Court Dismisses Lawsuit in Merchant Data-Breach Case,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 23, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9001391.
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this in mind the task force developed a strategic plan to combat
identity theft. 3 The plan identifies three stages of identity theft: 1) the
attempt to steal personal information, 2) the attempt to misuse
acquired information, and 3) the harming of the victim.84  The task
force also worked with the OMB to develop a memorandum to federal
agencies outlining data security measures and breach notification
procedures. 85 The most important aspect of the memorandum is that it
required all federal agencies to adopt a breach notification policy by
September 22, 2007.w Agencies are required to use a "best judgment
standard" in developing their breach notification procedures.87 This
standard is intended to be flexible and recognizes that one piece of
personally identifiable information may be sensitive at multiple levels,
depending on the context.
8 8
The memo includes four attachments that outline the notification
policy. The first emphasizes agencies' responsibilities to safeguard
information under existing law, and also requires a reduction in the use
of Social Security numbers and the encryption of all sensitive
information stored on devices carrying agency information.8 9  The
second attachment requires that every federal agency data breach be
reported internally to the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team ("US-CERT") within one hour of identifying that a
breach has or may have occurred. 90 The third attachment provides
guidance to assist agencies in developing an external notification
procedure, 91 including six elements they are expected to consider: 1)
whether breach notification is required; 2) the timeliness of the
83 THE PRESIDENT'S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra, note 72.
84 Id at 12-13. Of particular relevance to this note is the first stage, which often results in a
data breach.
85 Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, supra note 73. A risk-based decision framework
flowchart was in an earlier version of the memo, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2OO6/taskforcetheft-memo.pdf, at 11.
86 Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, supra note 73, at 1.
17 Id. at 1, note 6.
88 Id.
89 1d. at 7.
90Id. at 9.
9' Id. at 12.
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notification; 3) the source of the notification; 4) the contents of the
notification; 5) the means of providing the notification; and 6) who
receives the notification.
92
Additionally, in determining whether breach notification is
required, the agency must consider five specific factors: 1) the nature
of the data elements breached; 2) the number of individuals affected;
3) the likelihood the information is accessible and useable; 4) the
likelihood the breach may lead to harm; and 5) the ability of the
agency to mitigate the risk of harm.93 The fourth and final attachment
includes the OMB's new Rules and Consequences policy, which
emphasizes that managers, supervisors, and employees are all
responsible for safeguarding personally identifiable information.94
The policy notes that an individual's failure to act in accordance with
the OMB guidelines is a serious offense and can result in the
individual being reprimanded, suspended, removed, or otherwise
disciplined in accordance with agency policy.
95
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The OMB guidelines provided a rigorous framework for the
development of breach notification procedures within federal agencies,
however the same cannot be said for private entities. Currently, no
relevant federal legislation concerning data breaches involving private
entities has passed Congress.
In the wake of the VA incident, numerous bills were introduced in
the 109th Congress in 2006, but the session ended without any
legislation being passed.96 The issue continued to draw attention in the
1 10th Congress, where at least ten bills regarding data breach
notification have been introduced; however, none of the bills have
921d. at 13.
9' Id. at 14-5.
94 Id. at 21.
95 Id. at 22.
9 6 See, e.g., Veterans Identity and Credit Security Act of 2006, H.R. 5835, 109th Cong. (2006);
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2006); Financial Data Protection
Act, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2006); Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong.
(2006); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005); Data Security
Act, S. 3568, 109th Cong. (2006).
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been sent to committee.97  Notably, of the proposed legislation, only
two bills have been reported to the Senate: the Personal Data Privacy
and Security Act of 2007 and the Notification of Risk to Personal Data
Act of 2007.
The most critical issues facing federal legislators are the same as
those facing the states: the notification trigger and the possibility of an
encryption safe harbor. Under current law, states have the freedom to
take individual approaches to these two issues. Recently, however, the
issues have attracted the attention of federal legislators, and may
eventually be subject to preemption by federal law. Further
complicating federal efforts, is the issue of determining who bears the
responsibility of enforcing any new federal law.
The current round of proposed legislation takes a more refined
approach in determining the magnitude and severity of a data breach
than the bills proposed in the 109th Congress. Bills proposed in 2006
did not address the number of records affected, and attempted, without
success, to apply one-size-fits-all standards to both large and small
breaches. 98 This additional refinement enhances the sophistication of
the notification trigger; instead of being simply risk-based or
acquisition-based, the notification trigger considers the context of the
breach. For example, under the Cyber-Security Enhancement and
Consumer Data Protection Act of 2007, the trigger has two tiers: 99 if
information about more than 10,000 individuals is compromised, the
trigger is acquisition-based; 100 if information about fewer than 10,000
97 Data Security Act of 2007, H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Security Act of 2007, S.
1620, 110th Cong. (2007) (bill mirrors H.R. 1685); Cyber-Security Enhancement and
Consumer Data Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007); Personal Data
Protection Act of 2007, S. 1202, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R.
958, 110th Cong. (2007); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007);
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007); Federal
Agency Data Breach Protection Act, S. 1558, 110th Cong. (2007); Federal Agency Data
Breach Protection Act, H.R. 2124, 110th Cong. (2007) (similar to S. 1558); Identity Theft
Protection Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007).
98 See, e.g., Veterans Identity and Credit Security Act of 2006, H.R. 5835, 109th Cong. (2006);
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2006); Financial Data Protection
Act, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2006); Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong.
(2006); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005); Data Security
Act, S. 3568, 109th Cong. (2006).
99 Cyber-Security Enhancement and Consumer Data Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 836, 110th
Cong. § 1039 (2007).
100 d.
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individuals is involved, the more stringent risk-based trigger is used. 1 1
As a result, customers involved in large breaches may receive better
protection than those involved in small breaches. This disparity in
protection could serve to balance the interests of business, who find
notification to be time-consuming and expensive, with the interests of
consumers, who want to know when their information has been
compromised.
The two-tiered approach is used in a different way by the Identity
Theft Protection Act ("ITPA"). 10 2  Under the ITPA, a risk-based
trigger is used for all data breaches, but if the breach affects more than
1,000 individuals, the breached entity must notify the consumer credit
reporting agencies. 03 Stated another way, the breached entity has no
duty to notify the consumer credit reporting agencies if the breach
affects fewer than 1,000 individuals and the entity can show that there
is no reasonable risk of identity theft due to the breach.'0 4 However,
this bill is limited in scope since itapplies only to entities that have a
direct relationship with consumers.
The Federal Agency Data Breach Protection Act,0 6 introduced in
the House and Senate, and the Notification of Risk to Personal Data
Act of 2007, as reported in the Senate, 0 7 use yet another approach to
the notification trigger in an attempt to balance consumer and entity
interests. These bills set the default to the less stringent acquisition-
based trigger unless the entity chooses to perform a risk assessment, in
which case the more stringent risk-based trigger is used.108  If,
however, the entity determines from the risk assessment that there is
"no significant risk that [the] security breach has resulted in, or will
result in, harm to the individuals whose sensitive personally
101 Id.
102 Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007).
103 Id. § 3(a).
'
04 Id. § 3(b).
105 Id. § 3(c)(2).
106 Federal Agency Data Breach Protection Act, H.R. 2124, 110th Cong. (2007); Federal
Agency Data Breach Protection Act, S. 1558, 110th Cong. (2007).
107 Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007).
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identifiable information was subject to the security breach," then no
notification is required. 10 9
The proposed bills contain various terms that address encryption,
but, in general, encryption is approached in one of three ways: 1) by
exemption, 2) by rebuttable presumption, or 3) as a factor. An
exemption provision creates a safe harbor for data that is encrypted; no
notification is required if encrypted data is breached. A rebuttable
presumption provision creates a rebuttable presumption that no risk
exists if encrypted data is breached; no notification is required unless
harm is proven to exist. In factor provisions, encryption is treated as
merely a factor to consider when assessing the risk to individuals
whose records were breached.
Three bills contain specific exemptions for encrypted data, based
on the theory that encrypted data is neither usable nor personally
identifiable. l r' This approach frees the entity from its duty to
notify."' Six other bills contain rebuttable presumption provisions
that allow the breached entity to operate under the assumption that
there is no likelihood of harm. 112  Finally, one bill contains no safe
harbors or rebuttable presumptions, but considers encryption as one
factor to use in determining whether harm will reasonably result from
the breach."13
Consumer advocates generally favor federal legislation that
includes an acquisition-based trigger 1 4  and that preempts less
109 Id.
110 Two of the bills containing a safe harbor for data that is encrypted are the companion Data
Security Act of 2007 bills introduced simultaneously in the House and Senate. Data Security
Act of 2007, H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Security Act of 2007, S. 1620, 110th Cong.
(2007) (bill mirrors H.R. 1685); Personal Data Protection Act of 2007, S. 1202, 110th Cong.
(2007).
... H.R. 1685; S. 1202; S. 1620.
112 Cyber-Security Enhancement and Consumer Data Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 836, 110th
Cong. (2007); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); Federal
Agency Data Breach Protection Act, H.R. 2124, 110th Cong. (2007); Notification of Risk to
Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007); Personal Data Privacy and Security
Act, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007) (bill mirrors S. 1558); Federal Agency Data Breach
Protection Act, S. 1558, 110th Cong. (2007).
113 Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007). This bill also limits notification
to situations where there is a direct relationship between the entity suffering the breach and the
consumer. Id.
114 Roy Mark, Groups Slam Data Breach Notification Bill, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Mar. 17,
2006, http://www.intemetnews.com/security/article-php/3592416 ("We think consumers
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stringent state laws. Among those who favor a risk-based trigger,
however, there remains a divide between those who would have
federal legislation preempt state law and those who would not.
Proponents of preemption emphasize that a federal law would provide
greater uniformity by imposing a national standard and simplifying
compliance, especially among companies that do business in multiple
states.' '
5
Congress has also struggled with inter-committee turf battles over
which committee should be responsible for handling data breach
legislation.116 In 2006, data breach legislation was sent to a number of
different congressional committees, including the House Judiciary
Committee, the House Committee on Financial Services, the House
Commerce Committee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate
Commerce Committee, 117 and the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. 118 Since no committee is specifically
tasked with addressing information technology issues, it has largely
been up to the individual committees to determine who will be first to
push a data breach bill through Congress. Such a feat would, in all
likelihood, expand the focus and power of that committee to address
future technology issues.
V. STATE DEVELOPMENTS
While the federal government struggles to adopt any sort of
national standard through federal legislation, states continue to push
data breach bills through their legislatures. In 2006, thirteen states
passed data breach notification legislation, bringing the total number
should be notified in case of a breach and it shouldn't be left to the companies to decide.")
(quoting Susanna Montezemolo, a policy analyst with Consumers Union).
"5 See, Data Protection and the Consumer: Who Loses When Your Data Takes a Hike?:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Oversight, 109th Cong. 16-18
(2006), available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109h/28741.pdf (statement of
Steve DelBianco, Vice President for Public Policy at the Association for Competitive
Technology).
116 See Tory Newmyer, Data Security Bill Mired in Turf Battle, ROLL CALL (Aug. 7, 2006).
117 Roy Mark, Data Breach Bills Crowding Commerce, INTERNETNEWS.COM, May 12, 2006,
http://www.intemetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3605666.
118 Veterans Privacy Protection Act of 2006, S. 3176, 109th Cong. (2006).
[Vol. 3:3
of states with notification laws to thirty-four." 9 In 2007, bills dealing
with data breaches were introduced in at least twenty-six other
states.120 Arguably, the most significant piece of state data breach
legislation was enacted by Minnesota. 12 That bill creates two
safeguards for electronically stored information. The first, which took
effect on August 1, 2007, prohibits entities conducting business in
Minnesota from retaining credit card data for more than forty-eight
hours. 122  The second, which takes effect August 1, 2008, allows
financial institutions to recover costs associated with "reasonable
actions undertaken by the financial institution as a result of the breach
in order to protect the information of its cardholders.1 23
Reasonable actions include canceling or reissuing credit cards,
closing accounts, taking other actions to stop payment or block
transactions, opening or re-opening accounts affected by the breach,
refunding or crediting a cardholder for the cost of any unauthorized
transaction, and, finally, notifying cardholders affected by the
breach.124 Although this legislation does not provide a direct method
of recovery for consumers whose information has been compromised,
it does hold the breached entity liable for costs borne by financial
institutions. This liability may encourage those institutions to provide
compensation to their members.
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Texas have proposed
similar legislation. 125 The Connecticut House passed a bill that was
'
1 9 Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, 2006 Breach of Information Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breach06.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin all passed legislation in 2006. Id.
120 Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, 2007 Breach of Information Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breach07.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
121 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 108 (H.F. 1758) (West) (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 325E.64 and taking effect on August 1, 2007).
122 id.
123 id.
124 Id. subdiv. 3.
125 Posting of Randy Gainer to Privacy and Security Law Blog, http://www.privsecblog.com/
archives/securty-breaches-state-laws-to-shift-some-data-breach-costs-to-businesses-with-
weak-security.html (May 25, 2007).
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similar to Minnesota's law, 126 but the Connecticut Senate removed the
recovery provisions altogether. 127 The Connecticut bill, now devoid of
data breach references, was adopted by the legislature on July 11,
2007.128 The Illinois bill was nearly identical to the new Minnesota
law in sco e and in allowing costs to be recovered by financial
institutions. 29  The Massachusetts legislature passed several bills.
One bill was analogous to Minnesota's and allowed financial
institutions to recoup their costs, 130 while others purposefully excluded
such a provision.) 3"  The Texas version required that businesses
accepting credit cards comply with all Payment Card Industry ("PCI")
Data Security Standards ("DSS") requirements, 132 which recommend
that credit card data be retained for no longer than 48 hours. 133 The
Texas bill also allowed recovery in the same manner as the new
Minnesota law. 134  One important difference, however, is that the
Texas bill excluded financial institutions from the requirement to
adopt the PCI DSS standards.
135
V. PRIVATE SECTOR
Although the private sector remains focused on the data breach
legislation battles in Congress, it is also concerned with more practical
matters. In 2007, one of the biggest issues the private sector faced was
the effect of data breaches on corporate costs. These costs arise in two
126 S.B. 1089 (substitute), Gen. Assem., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (as reported to the
Senate Committee on Judiciary).
127 S.B. 1089, Gen. Assem., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (as signed into law).
128 id.
129 S.B. 1675, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (11. 2007).
130 H. 213, 186th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007).
131 Gainer, supra note 125.
132 H.B. 3222, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); see also PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL,
PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY(PCI) DATA SECURITY STANDARD 4 (2006),
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pcidss.v -1 .pdf.
133 PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 132.
134 H.B. 3222.
135 id.
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areas: data breach prevention and data breach remediation. As
legislation is passed and higher standards are enacted, corporations
must spend more money in responding to breaches. Costs result from
a variety of remedial actions such as "printing and postage of
notification letters, hiring a law firm to address legal issues, offering
credit monitoring subscriptions to customers, implementing a customer
support hotline and contract call center, as well as customer
defections."'
136
The Ponemon Institute, a research organization "dedicated to
advancing privacy and data protection practices,"'' 37 estimates the cost
of a data breach at $182 per compromised record, a thirty-one percent
increase from 2005.138 Cost estimates vary greatly, however. In an
email to CNET News, Forrester Research stated that a data breach
costs the breached entity between $90 and $305 per record.139 This
estimate varies depending upon the type of breach and the regulations
that apply, and was based on a survey of twenty-eight companies that
experienced data breaches. 140  Darwin Professional Underwriters, a
technology liability insurance company, has developed an online
calculator for determining how much a data breach would cost.'4 1 The
calculator uses a proprietary algorithm based on breach data reported
in the media and other industry resources, including the Ponemon
Institute study. 142 Testing of the calculator indicates, not surprisingly,
that the cost per breach decreases as the number of records breached
increases. At 250,000 records breached, the highest allowable input,
the cost per affected record is $51.42. When 1,000 records are
affected, the cost per record is $166.27. Some analysts, like Avivah
136 id.
137 The Ponemon Institute, http://www.ponemon.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
138 Robert Westervelt, Survey: Data Breach Costs Surge, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, Oct. 31,
2006, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sidl4_gcil227119,00.html.
139 Joris Evers, What's the Cost of a Data Breach?, CNET NEWS BLOG, April 13, 2007,
http://news.com.com/8301 -10784_3-6176074-7.htmI.
140 id.
141 Identity Theft Data Loss Cost Calculator, http://www.tech-404.com/calculator.html (last
visited Jan 5., 2008).
142 id.
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Litan, have questioned whether these estimates are inflated. 143  Litan,
an analyst at Gartner, Inc., responded to the calculator results stating:
"I wouldn't bet my house or my enterprise on these numbers. A lot of
the costs are often exaggerated.'"
One important factor in cost determination is the notification
trigger. If a low trigger were adopted, it could prove to be expensive
for businesses. First, it would require massive amounts of corporate
oversight to ensure that every possible breach was recognized. This
has proven to be difficult for many corporations. According to the
Ponemon Institute, only fifty-nine percent of companies believe they
can effectively detect a data breach. 145 Second, it can be difficult to
distinguish real breaches from false alarms. False positive rates can
run as high as thirty-five percent affecting an organization's ability to
accurately detect a real breach.146 Small data breaches, ones with
fewer than a hundred files, are the most troublesome for companies, as
they are likely to be detected only fifty-one percent of the time. 47 In
fact, thirty-five percent of organizations cited excessive cost as a
reason for not using technology to prevent data breaches. 148
The Chairman of the Ponemon Institute, Dr. Larry Ponemon, stated
that
[I]n spite of the increased attention being paid to the issue of
data security, enormous gaps remain in corporate America's
ability to effectively protect sensitive data, and that a lack of
143 Jaikumar Vijayan, Just How Much Will that Data Breach Cost Your Company?,
COMPUTERWORLD.COM, April 11, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/
article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9016296.
144id
145 Press Release, Ponemon Institute, Ponemon Institute Study Shows Lack of Accountability,
Resources at Root of U.S. Corporate Data Loss Problem I (Aug. 28, 2006),
http://www.ponemon.org/press/PonemonPortAuthorityDetectPr.pdf [hereinafter Ponemon
Institute]. See also Bill Brenner, Survey: Data Breaches Difficult to Spot, Prevent,
SEARCHSECURITY.COM, Aug. 31, 2006, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sidl4_gci 1213621,00.html.
146 Ponemon Institute, supra note 145, at 1.
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accountability as well as a dearth of resources dedicated to
the problem are at the root of the problem. 149
The most troublesome conclusion of the study, however, is that sixty-
three percent of corporations surveyed said they would not be able to
prevent future data breaches. °15 If data breaches are truly
unpreventable, there is an even more urgent need to establish
procedures for reacting to a breach, including notification of those
affected.
Even more costs arise once a data breach has been detected. These
costs include the postage to send notification letters, legal fees to
defend against impending litigation, and the cost to remedy the source
of the breach. For example, ChoicePoint reported $11.5 million in
costs directly related to the breach, as well as a post-breach decrease of
$720 million in its market capitalization.151 Large-scale data breaches
additionally carry implied litigation costs, but since plaintiffs have yet
to prevail in recovering damages from breached corporations, these
costs will likely be limited to attorney's fees.
152
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
While Congress has stagnated, federal agencies, state governments,
and the private sector have all made significant advances in developing
data breach policies and procedures. The OMB guidelines provide a
very clear structure for federal agencies to use when developing data
breach policies. In general, individuals whose information is stored by
a federal agency should feel protected. Even if a breach were to occur,
the OMB guidelines would ensure that US-CERT is notified, the
149 id.
150 Id.
11 Brian Koemer, The Cost of a Data Breach, ABOUT.COM,
http://idtheft.about.com/od/databreaches/qt/Breach-Costs.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
"
2 E.g., Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213-214 (M.D. Pa.
2006) (holding that the economic loss doctrine applies to data breach cases, and there can be
no recovery for negligence claims based solely on economic damages); Forbes v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006) (holding that the time and money spent
monitoring do not constitute recoverable damages, but rather that "[the defendants']
expenditure of time and money was not the result of any present injury, but rather the
anticipation of future injury." For a thorough review of litigation arising out of data breaches,
see Stephen Ambrose Jr., Joseph W. Gelb, & Walter E. Zalenski, Survey of Significant
Consumer Privacy Litigation in the United States in 2006, 62 Bus. LAW. 651 (2007).
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individual is notified, and the cause of the breach addressed.
However, in addition to the OMB requirements, agencies should adopt
sensible breach notification policies that protect the interests of the
affected individuals.
Ultimately, the biggest concern is whether individuals will be
notified when data stored at a corporation has been breached. Absent
congressional consensus on the issue, it is left to state governments
and corporations themselves to decide how to handle a data breach.
As the cost analysis indicates, it seems cheaper for corporations to be
proactive in their efforts to prevent data breaches rather than wait until
something happens and hope for the best. However, being proactive
requires up-front costs that the corporation may not want to pay. Due
to the lack of any law requiring notification in the event of a breach of
any stored piece of digital information, consumers should still be wary
that they may not be notified should their information end up in the
wrong hands. This is especially true in states employing a risk-based
trigger that puts the burden on the corporation to decide whether or not
to notify individuals.
The risk-based trigger appears problematic because it leaves the
notification decision to the breached institution, which may put its own
interests ahead of the affected individuals. Therefore, Congress should
strive to develop federal laws that employ an acquisition-based trigger.
This type of trigger would effectively require corporations to invest in
safeguarding data before a breach occurs, rather than afterwards. As
cost estimates have shown, this is an economically justifiable move,
and it stands to keep costs low even in the face of a consumer-friendly
trigger. However, because such a law would require the safeguarding
of corporate data, it should also provide an exemption for information
that can be shown to be unusable if breached, either due to encryption
or other proprietary methods the corporation may developed. The
most feasible exemption option would be to employ a rebuttable
presumption that the breach of unusable information poses no harm to
consumers.
It is apparent that while data breaches continue to be a serious
privacy issue, recent developments in the federal, state, and private
sectors have provided individuals with a base amount of security. The
rate at which data breaches occur seems likely to increase for the
coming years, and the burden will remain on information-storing
entities to begin to safeguard data more effectively. Nonetheless,
increased legislative effort and focused media attention should leave
consumers feeling more confident that their private information will
remain private.
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